A two-sector trade model with specific factors and perfect international capital mobility is used to analyze the optimal mix of factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy that faces domestic or international constraints on its tax instruments. In the unconstrained benchmark case, the small country will tax specific factors and domestic consumption but chooses zero tax rates for a selective production tax (i.e., an origin-based commodity tax) and a source-based tax on capital income. When commodity taxation must follow a combination of origin and destination principles, then this mixed commodity tax rate will be positive and its production effects are partly compensated in the optimum by a capital subsidy. These international restrictions interact with domestic constraints when rents accruing to fixed factors cannot be taxed by a separate instrument, and a positive tax rate on capital serves as an indirect way of rent taxation.
Introduction
The residence principle of capital taxation and the destination principle of commodity taxation have long been the dominant international tax principles, effectively shielding national tax systems from international tax competition. Recent developments have made it difficult, however, to enforce either of these 'desirable' principles of taxation. On the one hand, the increasing mobility of capital worldwide, together with the existence of tax havens, has put more reliance on source or withholding taxes on capital and has led to capital tax rates being lowered in many countries. As a recent example, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark have switched from a system of global income taxation (which requires the residence principle for its implementation) to a dual income tax with flat source-based taxes on capital earnings that are substantially below marginal tax rates on wage income (S0rensen, 1994) . At the same time, the origin principle of commodity taxation constitutes an increasingly important element in the trading system faced by integrating countries. This applies in particular to the European Union (EU), where the abolition of internal border controls has removed all restrictions on private purchases in neighbouring low-tax states. However, crossborder shopping is also prevalent in other parts of the world, for example at the Canada-U.S. border.
These developments have been reflected in a large body of literature, which can be divided into models of strategic interaction between large countries versus optimal tax rules followed by small open economies. The focus here is on the latter, and smaller, branch of that literature. A central result in the field of international capital taxation is that a country which faces an infinitely elastic supply of capital should not use source-based taxes on capital income if it is able to tax labour optimally and if there are no pure profits (Gordon, 1986; Frenkel, Razin and Sadka, 1991; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991) . This is an open economy version of Diamond and Mirrlees' (1971) production efficiency theorem. It has also been shown that if there are constraints on labour or profit taxation, or if foreigners own part of the domestic capital stock, then positive source taxes on capital will be levied even by a small open economy (Bruce, 1992; Slemrod, Hansen and Procter, 1994; Huizinga and Nielsen, 1995) .
Similar results have been obtained for international commodity taxation. Under perfect competition, Keen (1993) suggests--though does not show formally--that countries will endogenously prefer destination-over origin-based commodity taxes in order to maintain production efficiency. A case for the origin principle arises, however, in the presence of monopolies (Keen and Lahiri, 1994) . Finally, optimal tax rules have also been derived when pure destination taxes are not feasible due to cross-border shopping and markets are either perfectly or imperfectly competitive (Christiansen, 1994) .
While it is well understood by now that there are many parallels between capital taxation on the one hand and commodity taxation on the other, almost no attention has been given to the interaction between these two types of taxes. One of the reasons for this seems to lie in the mutually exclusive trade models that have been used in the different analyses. Models of capital income taxation usually focus on intertemporal trade in a single output good and thus preclude the integration of commodity taxes with distinct economic effects. In contrast, commodity taxation is generally studied in two-good models that do not allow for international capital mobility. The only exception I am aware of is Sinn (1990a), who uses a modified Heckscher-Ohlin trade model with internationally mobile capital. He studies the conditions under which commodity taxes and taxes on capital are neutral in their joint effects on trade flows and shows that a number of possible interaction patterns (labelled "additive" vs. "subtractive neutrality") can emerge. However, Sirra does not endogenize the tax rates set by the national governments and his results are thus not comparable to the optimal tax analyses cited above.
The present paper is an attempt to bridge this gap and provide an integrated treatment of direct and indirect taxes in an optimal taxation framework. The analysis is based on a mobile-capital version of the specific factors model, the second major workhorse of international trade theory. This choice has the advantage over the Heckscher-Ohlin framework that a small open economy produces all goods in a trade equilibrium with perfect capital mobility. In a first step, the analysis integrates results that have previously been derived in isolated models of either factor or commodity taxation. I then introduce both domestic and international constraints on the set of available tax instruments and study the interaction between different schemes of commodity taxation and source-based capital taxes in the resulting, constrained optimum. In particular, a relevant policy issue is whether a switch to partial origin taxation in the European Union is likely to reinforce or counteract the recent downward trend in capital tax rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the optimal tax model and introduces the set of tax instruments. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case where all tax instruments
